University of Connecticut

OpenCommons@UConn
Faculty Articles and Papers

School of Law

Summer 1982

Common Law Judging in a Statutory World: An
Address
Ellen Ash Peters
University of Connecticut School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://opencommons.uconn.edu/law_papers
Part of the Common Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Peters, Ellen Ash, "Common Law Judging in a Statutory World: An Address" (1982). Faculty Articles and Papers. 217.
https://opencommons.uconn.edu/law_papers/217

+(,121/,1(
Citation: 43 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 995 1981-1982

Content downloaded/printed from
HeinOnline (http://heinonline.org)
Mon Aug 15 17:18:21 2016
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from
uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
of your HeinOnline license, please use:
https://www.copyright.com/ccc/basicSearch.do?
&operation=go&searchType=0
&lastSearch=simple&all=on&titleOrStdNo=0041-9915

COMMON LAW JUDGING IN A STATUTORY WORLD: AN
ADDRESS*
Justice Ellen Ash Peters**
I am grateful for the opportunity to speculate in this lecture about
the future of common law judging in the world of statutes. I have
two special reasons for addressing the topic today. One arises out
of the difference in perspective that comes from being a judge
rather than an academician. The other is the publication of an extraordinary new book by my former colleague, Professor Guido
Calabresi, entitled "A Common Law for the Age of Statutes."1
It is hardly newsworthy that common law judging has undergone a revolution during the present century. When the twentieth
century began, law and lawmaking and law teaching were dominated by a view of the legal landscape often attributed to Professor
Christopher Columbus Langdell of the Harvard Law School, although Professor Arthur Corbin at Yale was an early disciple. In
their view, common law cases were for all practical purposes the
principal if not the exclusive source of law.2 It is true that there
were statutes here and there, some ancient and hence essentially
assimilated into the common law,3 such as the Statute of Frauds,
some more recent and hence to be strictly construed as in derogation of the common law.4 California of course had adopted the
Field Code in the nineteenth century," but that was essentially a
common law code that imposed few if any constraints on common
law development. Similarly, early twentieth century statutes were
not, except in technical fields such as negotiable instruments,
drafted to be competitive with the case law as it might emerge.
* This essay was originally delivered as a lecture on February 18, 1982, as part of the
Mellon Lecture Series, at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law. Footnotes have been
added to the lecture as originally delivered.
** Justice of the Supreme Court of Connecticut; former Southmayd Professor of Law,
Yale University.
1.

G. CALABREsi, A COMMON LAW FOR THE A-GE OF STATUTES (1982).

2. G. GJLMoRE, THE AGES OF AMERiCAN LAw 58-64 (1977).
3. Gilmore, Putting Senator Daivies in Context, 4 VT. L. Rxv. 233 (1979).
4. See GILMORE supra note 2, at 27.
5.

CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1-3543 (West 1954) (effective date Jan. 1, 1873). For historical

background on the legislative and judicial development of "The California Civil Code," see
the special commentary by Arvo Van Alstyne at 1 to 43 of the first volume of the Code.
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Samuel Williston wrote the Uniform Sales Act and, shortly thereafter, Williston on Sales. It turned out to matter little whether a
state had adopted the Sales Act or not. Where it was enacted, it
was often not cited; where it was not enacted, Williston on Sales
often furnished a satisfactory substitute authority. 6
This happy primacy of the common law courts came to be undermined, I believe, by two developments. On the one hand, the
school of jurisprudence called legal realism7 challenged the methodological authority of the rule of law as elicited from a particular
line of cases by demonstrating the ease with which a competing
rule of law could be derived from a competing line of cases depending upon one's selection of a relevant fact pattern. Secondly,
the New Deal, by accelerating the rate of change in the law, essentially by the use of legislation set the stage for statutory patterns
in the law that I believe to be irreversible in form, although perhaps, if President Reagan succeeds, they may be reversible in
substance.
It seems to be indisputable that by the end of this century,
our legal landscape will be one in which statutes of one kind or
another will be, not just occasional landmarks, but the dominant
features on the map. The federal courts are there already. Felix
Frankfurter made that observation about the Supreme Court of
the United States some thirty-five years ago,' and other federal
judges have shared his observations since then. 9 I must report that
state courts have, if somewhat belatedly, gotten into the statutory
swim. Reviewing the cases decided in my court since we started
this last October, I found only a scant ten percent of them to be
purely common law cases: two involving construction of deeds, and
one concerning the propriety of imposing equitable restraints upon
the enforcement of a promissory note. Everywhere else, statutes
were relevant if not determinative of the controversy. Significantly,
the role of statutes is just as crucial in the litigation involving socalled common law subjects, such as torts, contracts, property, and
procedure, as elsewhere. Litigated negligence cases, when they con6.

Gilmore, On Statutory Obsolescence, 39 U. COLO. L. REv. 461, 466-67 (1967).

J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIL (1949).
8. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 312 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring); Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REv.
7.

527 (1947).
9. R. KE rON, VEmNUNG TO DO JUSTICE (1969); Friendly, The Gap in LawmakingJudges Who Can't and Legislators Who Won't, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 787 (1963).
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cern accidents in the workplace, run into workers' compensation
statutes; when they arise out of automobile accidents, they run
into motor vehicle statutes. Contract cases are affected by the Uniform Commercial Code, by statutory liens such as mechanic's liens,
and by a host of licensing statutes. Procedure is governed by judicially adopted rules of practice that are legislative in their effect
even though they are judicial in their origin. Real property law is
heavily influenced by local regulation in the form of zoning ordinances and by state and national regulation in the form of environmental controls.
Even in cases to which no statute presently applies, the fact
that the legislature is always, or virtually always, in session casts a
considerable shadow on innovation in common law growth and development. For example, there is a growing caselaw concerning employer liability for the retaliatory discharge of an employee hired
at will. 10 From one perspective this is ordinary, or almost ordinary,
tort law, analogous to tort liability for malicious misuse of legal
process. Yet a court deciding whether to impose such liability for
the first time must be concerned with the inferences to be drawn
from recent legislative refusal to act on a statute requiring all discharges to be "for cause" or from recent legislative enactment of a
statute forbidding discharge of an employee in the limited case of
his testimony, under subpoena, as a witness in a criminal case.
Like the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Geary v, United States
Steel Corporation,1 the Connecticut court, in Sheets v. Teddy's
Frosted Foods, Inc.,1 2 has been willing to define a common law
cause of action for a retaliatory discharge that substantially implicates state policy, but the opinions have not been without their
critics. Other important questions of policy, such as governmental
immunity for tort liability, the Connecticut Supreme Court, at
least, has not been ready to re-examine, in large measure because
of the limited exemptions that the legislature has from time to
time created.
10. For documentations of this judicial trend, see Weiss, State by State: Chipping
Away at Employment At-Will, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 18, 1982, at 26 (collecting state court decisions challenging the common law employment at will rule); 24 A.T.L.A. L. REP. 386 (Nov.
1981) (report on recent cases finding liability for abusive .or retaliatory discharge of at-will
employees); and Olsen, Wrongful Discharge Claims Raised By At Will Employees: A New
Legal Concern for Employees, LAB. L.J. 265 (May 1981).
11. 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974) (in dicta); Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc.,
255 Pa. Super. Ct. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978)(holding).
12. 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980) (referring to Conn. H.B. No. 5179, 1974 Sess.).
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In sum, it is clear that the relationship between statutes and
common law cases has taken a turn of nearly 180 degrees from the
point at which we appear to have started at the beginning of the
century. Statutes are now central to the law in the courts, and judicial lawmaking must take statutes into account virtually all of
the time.'" As statutes have become ubiquitous, judicial attitudes
have adapted to the changing scene. Hardly ever is a statute now
regarded as a candidate for narrow construction because it may be
in derogation of the common law. More often, the issue is rather to
what extent a statute is itself a source of policy for consistent common law development.
I would like to discuss three aspects of the statutory world
into which we have emerged. The first is the question of how statutes should be researched and interpreted, in short the problem of
statutory construction. The second is the question of how common
law developments are affected by statutes even when, properly interpreted, the statutes do not govern. The third is the question of
the extent to which common law courts can restrict the application
of statutes which, when properly interpreted, do govern.
I.
Statutory construction seems, at first blush, to be too mundane a
subject to discuss at all. 14 Sutherland has, after all, written
volumes, volumes that one suspects are more often cited than read.
Regrettably the judicial vantage point reveals some recurring
trouble spots. The first of these is the difficulty that we all encounter in locating relevant statutes. I am of course particularly sensitive to cases in which the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) is
overlooked, 15 which arise with dismal regularity. But the U.C.C. is
not the only statute that fails to surface. Courts and counsel frequently miss a statute that is directly in point" and rarely venture
in search of statutes that are indirectly applicable. I can only speculate why this unhappy state of affairs should persist. Of prime
importance is the fact that few of us have been trained to do statu13. See Friedman, Kagen, Cartwright & Wheeler, State Supreme Courts: A Century
of Style and Citation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 773, 808-10 (1981).
14. J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (3d ed. 1943). See also C.
SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (4th ed. 1975) (a revision of the 3d ed. of
SUTHERLAND supra).
15. See, e.g., Bead Chain Mfg. Co. v. Saxon Prods., Inc., - Conn. -, 439 A.2d 314
(1981).
16. See, e.g., State v. Burke, - Conn. -, 438 A.2d 93 (1980).
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tory research. We cut our legal teeth on cases, not statutes, and we
tend, therefore, to look for cases rather than for statutes. It is almost as if a statute was not firmly planted in the legal turf until
some court had found it and commented upon its scope and meaning. Furthermore, the legal materials that we use most comfortably
are case oriented rather than statute oriented. When the legislature passes a statute reversing or modifying a common law line of
cases, that fact is not generally noted in the case digests or in the
case Shepard's. Even when one thinks to look in the legislative indices, they tend to be unhelpful for anyone without pre-knowledge
of the statute's existence. The indices are, for the most part, vertically organized, by existing statutory classifications, rather than
horizontally across statutory lines. To revert again to the U.C.C.
cases with which I am familiar, the general index to the Connecticut statutes 17 contains no reference for unconscionability' 8 or for
impracticability of performance. 19 To discover, in Connecticut,
that the U.C.C. has suggestions for the law of accord and satisfaction, one would have to know to look under "reservation of
rights. ' 20 Perhaps electronic retrieval will remedy this situation, although even -there it may well be necessary to rely on educated
surmise to discover the language that the statutory author is likely
to have employed. There is an urgent need for lawyers to develop
greater sensitivity and better techniques for locating relevant statutory materials.2
Having found a statute that may apply, a lawyer is then faced
with the task of reading it. What a cheerless undertaking! Cases
are fascinating; they engage our attention because of the human
drama that they portray, but statutes! That is why it is much easier to read comments on statutes than statutes themselves (note
the "Comments on Comments" by Skilton).2 2 It takes an extraordinary act of will to work through a statute of any length. While it is
clear that every word must be read, it is equally apparent that a
reader cannot rely on the literal meaning of every word, without
inquiring how that word is used elsewhere in the statute. In the
17. CONN. GEN. STAT.
18. U.C.C. § 2-302.

ANN.

Index (West 1975).

19. U.C.C. § 2-615.
20. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 42a-1-207, 42a-3-606 at 42a (West 1960).
21. Perhaps a first step would be a unified case-statute index.
22. Skilton, Some Comments on the Comments to the Uniform Commercial Code,
1966 Wis. L. REv. 597.
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U.C.C. there are some sections, such as the one dealing with installment contracts,23 that are intrinsically unreadable, and others,
such as those dealing with negotiation of negotiable instruments,
that only become unreadable when read in unison with each
other. 24 In Connecticut we have an intricate mechanic's lien statute. 25 I have had five cases dealing with it and have only now come
to begin to unravel it in its entirety.26 With deference, I think that
with all of the emphasis recently placed on teaching clinical skills,
we have insufficiently noted the importance of teaching statutory
skills.
Of course, some statutes come to us with helpful secondary
gloss. They may have a legislative history, although in state legislation such a history is more often the exception than the rule. Many
statutes are the product of compromise and tradeoff, so that the
search for a single legislative intent is fruitless. Even statutes
which have no history may, however, develop a present source of
interpretation. Statutes whose enforcement is entrusted, in the
first instance, to administrative agencies often generate regulations
which, once located, are enormously helpful. Regulations, because
of their greater specificity and because they are frequently blessed
with illustrative examples, tend, like "official comments," to be
much more readable than the underlying statutes. It is clear that
the Internal Revenue Code would be entirely impenetrable to any
non-specialist without Internal Revenue Service regulations. On a
state level, insurance and banking regulations often serve a similar
highly useful function.
There is, however, another source of interpretation that is less
accessible than legislative history or administrative gloss. As common law lawyers we are trained to search for analogy when we seek
to understand the case law that confronts us. It is just as vital to
think by analogy when dealing with statutes. Let me cite two illustrative examples.
Last spring, the Connecticut Supreme Court had a case, England v. England,2 7 in which the principal issue was the availability
of a prejudgment remedy in a law suit sounding in equity rather
23. U.C.C. § 2-612.
24. U.C.C. §§ 1-201(20), 3-202, 3-204. See Book Review, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1487, 148890 (1973).
25. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 49-33 to 49-51 (West 1978).
26. See, e.g., Seaman v. Climate Control Corp., - Conn. _, 436 A.2d 271 (1980).
27. 42 C.L.J. 45 (Conn. 1981).
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than in law. The statute directly applicable permitted an attachment "in any civil action in which a judgment or decree for the
payment of money may be rendered.

' 28

That language was not

very helpful for a plaintiff whose prayer for relief asked for an order requiring the defendant to set up a trust. It is true that the
plaintiff had also thought to append a boilerplate provision requesting such other equitable and legal relief as might be necessary
and proper. At one point in our deliberations there was considerable judicial sentiment for fastening upon his addendum to the
complaint as a basis for affirming the trial court's granting of the
attachment. A later set of statutes furnished a broader, and I beleve sounder, basis for the affirmance. In response to decisions by
the Supreme Court of the United States, such as Fuentes v.
Shevin,29 the legislature had enacted a series of procedural safeguards surrounding applications for prejudgment remedies, provisions for hearings and bonds and the like. 0 These recent statutes,
containing procedural amendments to the pre-existing law of attachments and garnishments, described prejudgment remedies as
being generally available "in any action at law or at equity."31 This
broader language in the later statutes cast a new statutory gloss on
the earlier provision, and enabled us to hold, once and for all, that
prejudgment remedies are available in both legal and equitable
proceedings. I do not mean to suggest that 1981 was any too early
for the joinder of law and equity to manifest itself in Connecticut
law. I do, however, believe that statutes are best interpreted as
part of the mass of legislative enactments.
Another example of the need to search out related statutes
stands out in my mind because it was one of the first cases
asssigned to me in 1978 when I joined the court. Phipps v. Niejadlik 32

concerned a teacher who had suffered a heart attack while he

was teaching at one of the state colleges. The record revealed the
concession that his myocardial infarction was not causally related
to his employment; he was overweight, perhaps even a smoker. In
any event, the legal issue was his widow's entitlement to recover
benefits under a statute covering "an injury sustained while acting
28. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-329 (West 1960).
29. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
30. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-278(a) to 52-278(m) (West Supp. 1981).
31. Id. § 52-278(b).
32. 175 Conn. 424, 399 A.2d 1256 (1978).
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within the scope of employment.""3 The court had to decide
whether a heart attack could constitute an "injury" and, if it could,
whether this injury could be said to have been sustained "within
the scope of employment." In interpreting this latter language, it
seemed important to compare it with similar language in other sections defining, on the one hand, benefits under workers' compensation, and on the other, benefits for other state employees similarly
or dissimilarly situated. Not surprisingly, such an expanded scope
of reference cast a different light upon the meaning of the directly
relevant section than that which could be gleaned from the reading
of that section alone. The majority opinion came to be criticized
from two sides. On the one hand, there was a dissenting opinion
stating that the majority had gone too far afield in departing from
the plain language of what the section directly in point had to
say. 4 I do not want to debate what meaning is plain-I find few
things plain in the language of the law-but I do believe that the
majority's frame of reference was the only appropriate one. Finding analogous statutes is, however, no easy undertaking. When the
opinion was published, it was criticized from the other side, for
having failed to consider still other provisions that might have
been relevant. I must acknowledge that that was very likely true.
The court's failure to exhaust the relevant statutes illustrates the
precise point that I want to make. We need to learn how to think
about statutes by analogy as aggressively and as extensively as we
presently think about cases by analogy. We need to train ourselves
to think statutes through.
In addition to legislative history, administrative regulations,
and related statutes, there is still a fourth source of learning to
help us to interpret statutes intelligently. That is the common law
that surrounds a particular statutory enactment. Certainly the law
of substantial performance in the common law of contracts has had
a bearing on the statutory perfect tender rule in the law of sales3 5
Courts can justly be criticized only for their lack of candor in revealing the extent to which common law seepage is regularly allowed to permeate the interstices of statutory development. Some
statutes of course invite such osmosis.30 When article 2 of the
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 5-144 (West 1969).
34. 175 Conn. 424, 399 A.2d 1256, 1260 (Bogdanski, J., dissenting).
35. Honnold, Buyer's Right of Rejection: A Study in the Impact of Codification Upon
a Commercial Problem, 97 U. PA. L. Rlv. 457 (1949).
36. See CALABREs, supra note 1.
33.
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U.C.C. was being drafted in the 1940s, the assault on the citadel of
privity was still confined to minor skirmishes in the context of particularly virulent goods such as defective foodstuffs or egregious
breaches of express warranty. By the time of the U.C.C.'s enactment in the 1950s and 1960s, the privity battle was in full swing,37
and the U.C.C.'s implied warranty sections had to be made to fit,
lest they be reduced to instant obsolescence. Few state courts had
substantial difficulty in making the adaptation, and fewer, to my
knowledge, expressed any misgivings about attributing expansive
meaning to narrowly defined statutory concepts of sales and sellers. In Connecticut, fortunately, this conundrum did not have to
be faced, since in enacting section 2-318, the Connecticut legislature added a sentence saying expressly that "the section is neutral
and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing caselaw on
whether the seller's warranties ... extend to other persons in the

distributive chain." '
It is serendipitous when those who draft statutes opt for a
style which makes the statute a framework within which the law
can develop rather than a straight-jacket that limits its growth. I
have commented elsewhere that even within the U.C.C. the draftsmen adopted drafting styles, sometimes for reasons beyond their
control, that exhibit marked divergences in attitudes about the relationship between statutory fiat and common law development. 9
Bankruptcy law as a backdrop for secured commercial transactions
mandates a different approach than international banking law imposes on letters of credit. When background permits, however, a
healthy respect for the scarcity of unclouded crystal balls counsels
caution about the risks of statutory overdrafting.
It is not only in commercial law that courts are called upon to
read statutes purposefully in order to make them accommodate to
needs that the legislature did not clearly foresee. In construing
statutes facially, courts often encounter problems that raise serious
constitutional questions about the validity of a statute. It is sometimes feasible to consider construing a statute in a way that the
language does not, on first literal reading, suggest. It is not unusual
37. Prosser, Assault upon the Citadel, (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YAM
L.J. 1099 (1960).
38. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42a-2-318 (comment 3)(West 1960).
39. See Jackson & Peters, Quest for Uncertainty:A Proposalfor Flexible Resolution
of Inherent Conflicts Between Article 2 and Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 87
YALE L.J. 907 (1978).
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to read into a statute a requirement that a government official
must give proper notice of his action in order to avoid problems of
procedural due process. 40 In order to avoid an argument of denial
of equal protection, a statute may be construed to treat alike those
between whom a statute, on a literal reading, might differentiate.
For example, the Connecticut court had to construe a statute providing good time credits for convicted criminals,4 1 which appeared,
on its face, to tie such credits, which determine the length of confinement in prison, to the date of a criminal defendant's original
incarceration, rather than to the date of his reconviction when a
new trial had been required to resolve his case. The literal wording
of the statute would have distinguished between a defendant out
on bail, pending his first appeal, and one immediately incarcerated.
Poverty is sufficiently close to being a suspect classification for
equal protection purposes so that the court read the statute to
avoid the invidious distinction.
I believe that common law courts have a responsibility to read
statutes contextually as well as literally. I know that others do not
agree. Long ago when I was spending a day at the Harvard Law
School, I happened to discuss with Erwin Griswold, then its Dean,
my interest in working out a casebook 42 for the Uniform Commercial Code which would take such a contextual point of view, which
would seek to relate and to evaluate its provisions by comparing
them with the emerging common law in less codified areas. Dean
Griswold thought this was an entirely wrongheaded approach. It
was much more appropriate, he thought, to focus entirely on the
statutes themselves and to see them as a source of law independent
of common law interference. Perhaps our difference in viewpoint is
in part attributable to our differences in field. Tax law may well
pose different problems. And I acknowledge that in my approach
there is the risk of moving too rapidly from statute to gloss, to
overleap too quickly the difficult task of ascertaining first, with absolute clarity, what the statute itself has to offer before deciding
whether marginal adaptation is appropriate.
I am, however, comforted by the fact that what I propose has
honorable historical roots in what another former Harvard Dean,
40.
41.
53a-381
42.

See, e.g., Kron v. Thelen, 178 Conn. 189, 423 A.2d 857 (1979).
Moscone v. Manson, 43 C.L.J. 4 (Conn. 1981)(construing CONN.
(West 1972)).
E. PETERS, CoMmzRc1L TRANSACTIONS (1971).

GEN. STAT. ANN.

§
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James Landis, once called "the equity of the statute." Under its
authority, "exceptions dictated by sound policy were written by
judges into loose statutory generalizations, and... situations were
brought within the reach of the statute that admittedly lay without
its express terms."4 4 The doctrine of "the equity of the statute"

appears to have fallen into disrepute when Blackstone came upon
the legal scene in the eighteenth century. It must be acknowledged
that the historical notion of "the equity of the statute" may appear
today to give too unlimited a range of authority to common law
judges. It must be noted furthermore that the doctrine arose at a
time when statutes were drafted more broadly and in a parliamentary system of government where separation of powers was less
well defined than under our law. Nonetheless, I think we do better
to recognize candidly, as Dean Landis urged, that common law developments and statutes are equally important constituent elements that a court must attempt to fuse in order to serve the interests of justice.
II.

What has been said so far about interpretation cannot of course
serve to describe the totality of the relationship between case law
and statutory law. Plainly, every statute has some boundaries, and
the question then arises whether, and when, it is appropriate to
apply the statute, as a matter of common law, beyond its designated boundaries.
I do not believe that there is any longer any serious doubt that
statutes may have what one might call an extraterritorial effect.
Judge Lehman of the New York Court of Appeals, in the 1934 case
of Agar v. Orda," stated the proposition as follows. By placing certain rules into a statutory code, the legislature had, as he put it,
"shattered or destroyed general common-law [sic] rules inconsistent with the statutory code."'46 In determining the rules applicable
in cases not covered by the statutes, the court was therefore obligated to determine whether there were inherent differences between those cases outside the statute and those within it. In the
absence of such inherent differences, in order to reestablish a gen43.
(1934).
44.
45.
46.

Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARvARD
Id. at 215.
264 N.Y. 248, 190 N.E. 479 (1934).
Id. at 252, 190 N.E. at 480.

LEGAL

ESSAYS 213, 214
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erally consistent common law universe, the statutory rule would be
applied. Agar v. Orda concerned remedies for breach of contract in
transactions involving choses in action-stocks rather than goods.
The U.C.C. has similarly been used as a source of law in federal
cases involving impracticability of performance, and in state cases
involving unconscionability. 47 To turn to non-commercial law examples, OSHA regulations inform common law negligence by constituting evidence of the standard of care required to be maintained at a worksite. 48 The Connecticut court has presently before
it a case in which it must decide whether the various statutes governing misuse of a motor vehicle combine to impose liability on a
police officer who fails to stop an errant motorist before he causes
personal injury to another.
The only limit that a court is likely to encounter in its consideration of a statute as a source of common law policy is the practical one of locating the statute that it ought to take into account.
That problem I have already noted. Its importance bears underlining but not repetition.
III.
Lastly, let us consider the inverse of the case law/statutory law relationship just noted. That is, what authority does a court have to
refuse to enforce a statute that, properly interpreted, applies to
the case at hand, but appears, nonetheless, to be in some way
fatally flawed? This is the issue that is the central concern of Professor Calabresi's recent book.49 Professor Grant Gilmore also has
written on this subject.5 0 For this question, there are no easy answers, only tentative suggestions and cautious proposals.
The limits of this discourse are about the only aspect as to
which there is general agreement. Courts are not free simply to
disregard statutes which, as legislators, they would have voted
against. Legislators are not required to make policy decisions that
please courts; legislators are not even required to make policy decisions that are universally fair.51 Unless legislative action runs into
47. See Traynor, Statutes Revolving in Common-Law Orbits, 17 CATH. U.L. REv. 401
(1968).
48. Wendland v. Ridgefield Construction Services, Inc., 42 C.L.J. 46 (Conn. 1981).
49. CALABRESI, supra note 1. See also Calabresi, The Nonprimacy of Statutes Act: A
Comment, 4 VT. L. REv. 247 (1979).
50. Gilmore, Putting Senator Davies in Context, 4 VT. L. REv. 233 (1979).
51. See CALAREsi, supra note 1.
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constitutional constraints, the legislative voice generally determines the demands of policy and the ultimate choice among social
and fiscal responses. There is, furthermore, widespread agreement,
at least in the scholarly community, that courts risk much and gain
52
little unless they use their constitutional powers sparingly.
With respect to caution in the use of constitutional authority,
there is, on the whole, little to fear from state judges. The state
court house is, if anything, too close to the state legislative house.
Far from shutting the door to further legislative action, in Connecticut at least, most decisions involving unconstitutionality have
concerned failures of procedural due process which the legislature
has had no difficulty correcting.'3 The court decided last year that
a statutory limitation on the serving of alcohol in restaurants on
Good Friday violated the first amendment; 54 the legislature
promptly built on that decision to permit liquor sales as well by
package stores. 5 Possibly it was more controversial to invalidate
the Sunday closing law, although the statute that was finally
struck down gave considerable evidence of having been deliberately torpedoed in the legislature through the accretion of everexpanding exemptions.58 Perhaps the most far-reaching constitutional decision of the last ten years has been the case in which
local school financing devices were found to be constitutionally inadequate, but there too the court stayed its hand to allow the legislature a chance to regroup and to find a constitutionally (and politically) viable solution.57
That leaves us with the statute which is not unconstitutional
but which a court would nonetheless like to influence. The class of
such statutes is differently defined by Professors Calabresi and
Gilmore and me. Professor Calabresi is most concerned with statutory obsolescence, with statutes that continue to remain on the
books although their present reenactment seems doubtful.5 8 Pro52. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-47 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); Bickel, Forward:The Passive Virtues: The Supreme Court 1960 Term, 75 HARv. L. REv. 40 (1961).
53. See, e.g., Society for Savings v. Chestnut Estates, Inc., 176 Conn. 563, 409 A.2d
1020 (1979) (which led to an immediate amendment of the Connecticut mortgage foreclosure

statute).
54.

Griswold Inn, Inc. v. State of Connecticut, 42 C.L.J. 43 (Conn. 1981).

55.
56.
57.
58.

1981 Conn. Pub. Acts. 81-367.
See Caldor's, Inc. v. Bedding Barn, Inc., 177 Conn. 304, 417 A.2d 343 (1979).
Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977).
See CALABRESi, supra note 1, at chapter 1.
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fessor Gilmore says statutes are most unsatisfactory in their middle age. In his words, as always eminently quotable, "Admittedly
the statute is no longer what it once was but there is life in the old
dog yet. An occasional subsection still has teeth and subparagraph
(3)(b) may burn with a gem-like flame."59 For myself, I am most
troubled about what the legislature has done lately. The democratization of our political processes, the pressure for the immediate
institutional responses, the spotlight cast by the media, all have
the capacity for producing legislation that is, from its inception, illconceived. Chief Justice Rose Bird of the California Supreme
Court, speaking at the National Judicial College last fall on "The
Role of the Judge in the 80's," noted the extent to which we have
as a nation come to place a higher value on image and on speed
than on sober reflection. "Life in the fast lane," as she put it, is
reflected in a headlong rush by legislators to achieve a quick fix for
every social problem. Legislators feel that they need to stand up
and be counted, on subjects ranging from the appropriateness of
allowing physicians to prescribe marijuana for patients on chemotherapy to the desirability of requiring juries to convict, rather
than to acquit, criminal defendants who are found to be insane.
Who can be sure that these statutes, almost always well-intentioned, may not hit an entirely unforeseen obstacle or target?
It is apparent that different observers of the statutory scene
will inevitably focus on different unfortunate statutes whose continued existence, in their present form, strikes them as regrettable.
Those who are scholars are of course always in a position to suggest amendments and deletions. From law revision commissions, if
they survive budgetary incursions, we can hope for systematic efforts at keeping the statutory law consistent and up-to-date. Yet,
the reality is that reform efforts do not have the same legislative
appeal as do statutory innovations. It is notoriously easier, so all
the commentators would agree, to pass a statute than to revise it. 60
Should courts, because they are, after all, removed from the political battleground, because they are not majoritarian institutions,
simply accept the failings of statutory processes, of what Professor
Calabresi calls statutorification? What alternatives do courts have,
other than misuse of their constitutional powers or distortion of
their interpretive powers?
59. GILMORE, supra note 2, at 96.
60. See CALABRESi, supra note 1, at 79.
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Professor Calabresi calls this the problem of assigning the burden of legislative inertia." He proposes that we consider ways and
means by which courts might persuade legislatures to take a second look at statutes that are or might become misguided missiles.
To paraphrase his words, we need to see if courts can be used,
through techniques analogous to those employed in making common law, to determine where the burden of inertia ought to lie to
force the legislative agenda. After all, he argues, all judicial nonconstitutional lawmaking is in a sense conditional, because in a
democratic society, it is always subject to revision by the legislature.2 We all recognize that much judicial lawmaking is silently
ratified by long periods of legislative acquiescence. We countenance judicial lawmaking, although it is often removed from immediate majoritarian control in fact, because we think that judges, by
virture of their training and their independence, are well suited to
mapping out the legal landscape. If we accept all of that, and if we
allow courts periodically to update the common law, why not countenance judicial modification of statutes? In either case, if the
courts are moving too far from the policies which the legislature
wants to enforce, the legislature is free to act, and will retain the
last word.
The question a court ought to ask itself, the first judgment it
must make, according to Professor Calabresi, is whether the disputed statute "fits" the legal landscape, because that is what a
court is good at discerning and because "fit" is likely to correlate
with continued majoritarian support for the statute. In looking at
"fit," a court will naturally consider both the surrounding common
law and the surrounding statutory law that make up the legal landscape. Indeed, Professor Calabresi urges that consideration also be
given to the accretion of scholarly criticism, to take into account
both intellectual and technological revolutions. Tellingly, he notes
that the life expectancy of a statute varies with its age. "As with
people, the life expectancy of a statute and of a judicial decision,
too, is relatively low right after birth, becomes very high after the
rule has survived a few years, and then diminishes as it ages. ' 6 3
If a court decides that a statute is not a good "fit," what then?
Can a court impose a new rule in substitution for the statute? A
court can indicate its displeasure with the existing rule, while con61. Id. at 80.
62. Id. at chapter 9.
63. Id. at 132.
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tinuing to apply it, and can hope that its unkind words will provoke a legislative response. If there is opportunity to threaten
rather than to act, there is less danger of treading on doctrinally
difficult waters. To the litigant, the news that he will lose, although
some day the law will change, is of course not particularly gratifying, but he may nonetheless have served the cause of justice. This
technique for dealing with statutes resembles prospective overruling of a common law doctrine, and encounters the same tensions
between long run and short run fairness.' Alternatively, a court
may simply refuse to apply the statute and await legislative response to this more provocative form of judicial lawmaking. Often,
that solution, although theoretically cleaner, may not be available.
Take two related tort/contract problems. Courts could, and did, revise into virtual oblivion sections of the Uniform Commercial Code
that had failed to anticipate the consumer revolution in products
liability. 5 But courts do not have the capacity to revise out-of-date
payment schedules for workers' compensation and could only bring
that issue to legislative attention by direct criticism of the existing
standards or by limiting application of the existing workers' compensation system. Finally, courts, in contemplating what "fits,"
must bear in mind the possibility that the legislature was deliberately creating a special exception, and was not intending to enact
good fit.
That, in the briefest of outlines, is the Calabresi thesis.
Clearly, no two critical observers of the relationship between statutory law and case law will strike quite the same balance for the
judge who wants to respond intelligently and appropriately to the
complex statutory network that a court encounters. The Calabresi
book is invaluable for forcing us to think hard about the limits of
judicial power and the wisdom of its exercise. It is unquestionably
true that it is no longer possible to deal with statutes in isolation
from the common law. Yet judges who embrace the Calabresi thesis are as likely to find it as much a source of new questions as of
new answers. If judges perceive that legislation may have in-considered consequences for the legal landscape as a whole, must
judges not be equally reflective of the disruption that may follow
from judicial intrusion into policy making? Judicial intervention
may be seductively tempting because of the particular facts of an
64.
65.

Id. at chapter 11.
U.C.C. §§ 2-316 and 2-719.
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especially appealing case that may be quite unrepresentative of the
legal landscape as a whole. It is still true that hard cases make bad
law. For those of us who are inclined to see ourselves as judicial
activists, it is nonetheless heady indeed to contemplate extension
of our hegemony to the world of statutes. Only a sober recognition
that we may intrude only when we must, and that we must step
cautiously when we can, will help us to begin to find our way. Professor Calabresi has begun to map out the difficult turf that lies
ahead, but a detailed roadmap must await another day.

